wht is the need of nuclear weapons
By rohangang11
@rohangang11 (32)
India
4 responses
@neh_singhal (32)
• India
3 Nov 06
no not at all .we dont need nukes .its probably the worst thing science evr created
@neh_singhal (32)
• India
3 Nov 06
ya it is jaz tht nukes are like destroyers of race
2 people like this
@amiksinha (1960)
• India
3 Nov 06
The time is right for a fundamental rethinking of the role of nuclear weapons in national defense and of the composition of our nuclear forces. The Cold War is over, but it has been replaced by new threats to our national security. Technology, here and abroad, is inexorably advancing, creating both dangers and opportunities for the United States. This paper analyzes the future role of nuclear weapons in national security, describes the roles and limitations of advanced conventional weapons in meeting strategic needs, and suggests several alternate scenarios for future U.S. nuclear forces.
The principal role of nuclear weapons is to deter potential adversaries from an attack on the United States, our allies, or our vital interests. Russia maintains very large strategic and tactical nuclear forces. China is actively modernizing its nuclear arsenal. India and Pakistan have dramatically demonstrated the ability of midlevel technology states to develop or acquire nuclear weapons. There are grave concerns about the future proliferation of nuclear weapons among such countries as North Korea, Iraq, and Iran. The nuclear age is far from over.
Advances in conventional weapons technology suggest that by 2020 precision long-range conventional weapons may be capable of performing some of the missions currently assigned to nuclear weapons. Today, uncertainty in the location of road mobile missiles carrying weapons of mass destruction might require a nuclear weapon for assured destruction. Future real-time imagery and battle management, combined with precision strike long-range missiles, may mean that a conventional weapon could effectively destroy such targets.
Some targets require the energy of a nuclear weapon for their destruction. However, precision targeting can greatly reduce the nuclear yield required to destroy such targets. Only a relatively few targets require high nuclear yields. Advantages of lower yields include reduced collateral damage, arms control advantages to the United States, and the possibility that such weapons could be maintained with higher confidence and at lower cost than our current nuclear arsenal.
Now is the time to reexamine the role and composition of our future nuclear forces. New technologies take at least a decade to move from the concept stage to the point where we can rely on them for our nation’s defense. And, advance planning is already under way for the replacements of our nuclear capable missiles, aircraft, and sub-marines. Prudent thought given to this crucial subject will reap great dividends for the United States and for peace in the world.
INTRODUCTION
Nuclear weapons played a pivotal role in international security during the latter half of the twentieth century. Despite rapid increases in communications, transportation, and weapons technology, there has been no large-scale strategic conflict since the Second World War. Nuclear weapons, as the most destructive instruments ever invented, had a stabilizing effect on superpower relations by making any conflict unacceptably costly. However, geopolitical change and the evolution of military technology suggest that the composition of our nuclear forces and our strategy for their employment may be different in the twenty-first century. The time is right for a fundamental rethinking of our expectations and requirements for these unique weapons.
Nuclear weapons are one component of an integrated defense strategy that includes diplomacy and conventional forces. The principal role of nuclear weapons was and continues to be that of deterring any potential adversaries from an attack on America or our vital interests. This role is expected to continue for as long as nuclear weapons hold the appellation of “supreme" instruments of military force. However, this does not mean that their role in military planning will not change at all. Changes in the geopolitical environment and the inexorable advance of military technology here and abroad suggest that the position of nuclear weapons in national security policy will evolve with time. Given the unique destructive power of nuclear weapons, it is essential that this evolution be planned, to the extent possible, with due consideration of the integration of strategic nuclear forces into a consistent and comprehensive policy for national security.
Even with the dramatic changes that have occurred in the world during the past decade, nuclear warplanning today is similar in many respects to what it was during the Cold War. The Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) is focused on a massive counterattack strategy that aims to eliminate the ability of an adversary to inflict further damage to American interests. Nuclear weapons provide an assured retaliatory capability to convince any adversary that aggression or coercion would be met with a response that would be certain, overwhelming, and devastating. It is often, but not universally, thought that nuclear weapons would be used only in extremis, when the nation is in the gravest danger. While there has been some discussion of “single weapon" strikes against isolated targets, such as sites of weapons of mass destruction, most of the attention in nuclear strategy has been and is directed toward large-scale engagements. This may not be true in the future.
The advance of conventional weapons technology may result in the ability of conventional weapons to perform some of the missions currently assigned to nuclear weapons. For example, take the case of a road mobile ballistic missile. If one knows the location of such a target and if one can place a conventional weapon on that target with meter-scale accuracy, then it can be destroyed without a nuclear weapon. On the other hand, if one does not know the location of the target to within many kilometers then even a nuclear weapon may not destroy it. The key parameters required for target destruction are intelligence and precision delivery, not the explosive force of the weapon. However, even if a weapon is precisely delivered to the correct target point, countermeasures as simple as steel netting, boulder fields, or decoys complicate reliance on conventional weapons with limited radii of destruction.
The role of nuclear weaponry as the ultimate deterrent to aggression and the ultimate destructive force in combat will likely lead to the retention of at least some nuclear forces for decades to come. However, the composition of our nuclear arsenal may undergo significant modification to respond to changing conditions, changing military needs, and changes in our confidence in our ability to maintain credible nuclear forces without nuclear testing or large-scale weapons production. Options for precision delivery of nuclear weapons may reduce the requirement for high yield. Lower yield weapons could be produced as modifications of existing weapons designs, or they could employ more rugged and simpler designs that might be developed and maintained with high confidence without nuclear testing and with a smaller nuclear weapons complex than we envision is required to maintain our current nuclear forces.
This paper attempts to look forward to the role that nuclear weapons might play in the twenty-first century, starting about 2020. A twenty-year horizon was chosen because over this time scale it is possible to make reasonable projections of technology and some assumptions about the probable threat situation. It takes about twenty years for substantially new weapons technologies to be developed and fielded into dependable military systems. Since this is true for other countries as well as the United States, one can project the development of potential adversarial capabilities to some degree. Of course, changes in governments could occur quickly compared to this time scale, but the technology that would be employed against the United States would proceed more slowly. This paper focuses on state-to-state defense and does not explicitly consider terrorism or the rapid evolution of entirely new state threats. It is unlikely that an emergent power would be able to develop the technology necessary to confront the United States on a time scale faster than two decades without some obvious indicators that would enable our technological or diplomatic response.
Why is this an important issue now? Current plans call for the deployment of the “next generation" of strategic forces in about 2020, including replacements for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine, and perhaps even the venerable B52 bomber. This strategic modernization will be expensive, and it is not too soon to begin the debate over what kinds of strategic forces are needed to meet future needs.
It takes at least a decade to deploy a new technology, and if research and development are required, additional time may be needed. For such a key component of national defense, it is not sufficient to merely demonstrate that new systems work. There must be sufficient time to shake out the inevitable problems associated with new systems so as to make them dependable beyond reasonable doubt of our own government and the governments of potential adversaries. Time must also be allowed for the negotiation of treaties or other international agreements that support the new force structure and that preclude the marginalization of our forces by either a massive breakout or any other action that would reduce the effectiveness of our forces. Finally, the twentieth century repeatedly demonstrated that sweeping geopolitical changes occur on a short time scale compared to our ability to respond with new technologies or doctrines. It is imperative to consider the widest range of potential options before a crisis develops and to maintain a sufficiently robust research and development base to enable a response at that time.
The development of naval air power during the 1930s is a prime example of the need
@rohangang11 (32)
• India
3 Nov 06
well done my frnd .but i wud like to have ur comment in brief
1 person likes this
@goldjohn1969 (54)
• Romania
6 Nov 06
From 1945 we live in a not sure world.We live in a dangerous world....
1 person likes this
@dnatureofdtrain (5273)
• Janesville, Wisconsin
26 Apr 07
In some cases the one with the biggest weapon can scared off two parties with the smaller weapons from attacking it or eachother, but in reality, for most cases. I do not see the Nuclear weapons, as making the world a safer place...
Not all Americans are for Nukes, I am an American, and I am totally against the use of Nuclear Energy in the form of a weapon at all. Everytime a nuke is set up it increases cancer in all living beings...
To me it is not worth it at all, for anyone to set off a Nuke weapon.
- DNatureofDTrain